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INTRODUCTION

After decades of financial decadence and total dominance over
political processes, coal companies have hit desperate times. Cheap,
abundant natural gas recently emerged, driving demand for coal for
energy production and coal prices down.1
The United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finally moved to more stringent
emissions limitations for coal-fired power plants under the Clean Air
Act.2 Concurrently, the public demanded improvements in safety
technology after several tragic mining accidents resulted from lax safety
measures and a corporate culture of recklessness.3
During this time, environmental citizen groups worked to ensure
that mining companies no longer violated the Clean Water Act (CWA),
particularly with the mountaintop removal (MTR) mining method.
Mining companies that previously enjoyed lax enforcement of water
violations by state environmental protection agencies and the EPA can no
longer discharge unlawful levels of pollutants into streams without facing
lawsuits by citizen groups.4 Mining companies pay steep penalties for
these violations.5 Courts are increasingly skeptical of the practice of
MTR and its compatibility with the CWA, concluding that what the law
1.
Mark Jaffe, Gas Moves in on Coal, DENVER POST, Oct. 23, 2009, at B5; Steven
Mufson, Alpha Natural Resources Will Close 8 Mines, Lay Off Hundreds, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
2012, at A16.
2.
Elizabeth Weise, Air Quality Rules Go into Effect, USA TODAY (Dec. 22, 2011),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/MONEY/usaedition/2011-12-22-mercury-rule_ST_U.htm.
See Steven Mufson, Coal Firms’ Profits Fall as the Cost of Mining Increases, WASH.
3.
POST, Oct. 26, 2012, at A17.
See Dan Lowrey, Arch Coal Agrees To Settle Selenium Pollution Suite for $2M, SNL
4.
COAL REPORT, Oct. 10, 2011, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
See David A. Fahrenthold, Mining Giant To Pay $20 Million EPA Fine: Runoff
5.
Polluted Waters in W. Va., Ky., WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2008, at A16; Arch Coal Clean Water Act
Settlement, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/arch-coal-clean-water-act-settlement (last
visited Nov. 25, 2013); Jeffrey Tomich, Patriot Coal Agrees To Settle Selenium Pollution Claims,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/patriot-coalagrees-to-settle-selenium-pollution-claims/article)3fa1908e-422b-11e1-92bc-0019bb30f31a.html.
The author notes that she represented West Virginia in the finalization of United States v. Arch
Coal, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 2d 408 (S.D. W. Va. 2011), but she was not involved in the negotiation or
settlement of the case. The cited material contains information that is available to the public.
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requires is sometimes contrary to “substantial scientific evidence.”6
Academic research on stream form and function concluded that streams
buried through MTR cannot be adequately mitigated or replaced by manmade streams under United States Army Corps of Engineers permitting.7
Coal companies rely upon stream mitigation as an essential component
for the continued viability of MTR.
The environmental challenges over the last decade have been
expensive. Mine site water treatment costs millions of dollars to
construct and operate.8 Several large coal companies have posted
significant quarterly losses.9 One large company has filed for
bankruptcy and agreed to cease MTR mining.10 Layoffs abound.11
Despite the grim outlook for coal companies, Appalachian coal-mining
states face worse situations.
Throughout this century, West Virginia has relied upon the taxes and
jobs provided through coal mining. West Virginia’s blind faith that coal
mining would always “keep the lights on” may very well lead the state
with some of the oldest,12 poorest,13 and unhealthiest14 residents in the
6.
See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 883 F. Supp. 2d
627, 645 (S.D. W. Va. 2012).
See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, The Environmental Costs of
7.
Mountaintop Mining Valley Fill Operations for Aquatic Ecosystems of the Central Appalachians,
1223 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 39, 39-40 (2011); Michael B. Griffith et al., The Effects of

Mountaintop Mines and Valley Fills on the Physiochemical Quality of Stream Ecosystems in the
Central Appalachians: A Review, SCI. TOTAL ENV’T, Feb. 15, 2012, at 1, 10; see also Kyle J.
Hartman et al., How Much Do Valley Fills Influence Headwater Streams?, 532 HYDROBIOLOGIA
91, 91-102 (2005); T. Ty Lindberg et al., Cumulative Impacts of Mountaintop Mining on an
Appalachian Watershed, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20,929, 20,929 (2011); Natasha Gilbert,
Mountain Mining Damages Streams, 466 NATURE 806, 806 (2010).
8.
Ken Ward Jr., Alpha To Spend $50 Million on Selenium Cleanups, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201112120123; Barry Cassell,
Patriot Says Selenium Court Ruling Will Cost It $50 Million, SNL COAL REPORT, Oct. 25, 2010,
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; Press Release, EPA, Consol To Pay $5.5 Million To Settle
Clean Water Act Violations (Mar. 14, 2001), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/16876ff
1c4fafa4385257853005cf373?OpenDocument (noting $200 million pollution clean-up initiative).
9.
Dan Lowrey, CONSOL Expects 1st Loss Since 2007 on Coal Mine Idlings,
Operational Troubles, SNL COAL REPORT, Oct. 22, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com;
Dan Lowrey, Patriot Coal Reports Hefty Q2 Loss on Asset Retirement Charges, Slumping
Revenues, SNL COAL REPORT, Aug. 10, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com; Janet
Patton, Arch Coal Lays Off Nearly 600 Kentucky Miners, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (June 21,
2012), http://www.kentucky.com/2012/06/21/2233013/arch-coal-lays-off-500-kentucky.html.
10. Bill Archer, Patriot Coal To Stop Mountaintop Removal Mining, BLUEFIELD DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 16, 2012, at 1; Jeffrey Tomich, Patriot Coal Declares Bankruptcy, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 10, 2012, at M1.
11. Mufson, supra note 1; Patton, supra note 9; Erich Schwartzel, CONSOL Idles Coal
Operations, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2012, at C1.
12. See Paul J. Nyden, W.Va. Faces Possible Caregiver Shortage, CHARLESTON GAZETTE
(June 19, 2011), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201106191318; Dan Sewell, Appalachia’s
Aging Population Is Rising Fast, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 21, 2012, at 1A.
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nation into even harder times. West Virginia now faces a very real
possibility that it will be solely responsible for liabilities estimated to
exceed $1.925 trillion and potentially exceed $10 trillion, a conservative
estimate for 20 years of treatment of the pollutant selenium alone if the
coal industry collapses.15
Setting aside the potential risk of wholesale selenium treatment,
West Virginia currently estimates that it will need $33.1 million for
capital construction costs and $6 million in annual treatment costs to
treat water pollution discharges at just those existing sites that previous
mining companies have already abandoned.16 That estimate does not take
into account the potential for a plethora of future abandoned sites or the
likelihood of industry-wide bankruptcies. The existing abandoned sites
will need treatment by the state for at least the next 35 years.17 At the end
of 2012, the West Virginia Special Reclamation Water Fund (Water
Fund) had a total of $9.4 million in assets.18 There are 553 permits in
West Virginia requiring treatment by the state.19 The number of new sites
requiring treatment by the state has increased steadily since 2001.20
This Article evaluates the viability of the Water Fund in light of
recent federal court decisions that require West Virginia to issue permits
to itself under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) structure of the CWA for abandoned mine sites subject to the
federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).21

13. Louise Boyle, If You Live in West Virginia, Look Away Now! The Most and Least
Livable States in America (and If You’re Thinking of Moving, Utah Is the Best Place To Be),
MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2187547/if-live-westvirginia-look-away-the-livable-states-america.html; Michael B. Sauter et al., America’s Richest
(and Poorest) States, 24/7 WALL ST. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://247wallst.com/special-report/2013/09/
19/americas-richest-and-poorest-states/7/ (ranking West Virginia the forty-eighth poorest state).
14. Boyle, supra note 13; Jared Hunt, Report Says Healthier Choices Would Cut W. Va.’s
Costs, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 18, 2012, at 2A.
15. See Paul Ziemkiewicz, Estimated Cost of Selenium Treatment at West Virginia Active
Mining Sites Using Zero Valent Iron and Fluidized Bed Reactor Technology 7 (Oct. 3, 2010)
(unpublished report) (on file with author).
16. Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council, Report of the Special Reclamation
Fund Advisory Council 15 (Jan. 31, 2012) (unpublished report) (on file with author).
17. Id. at 17.
18. Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council, Report of the Special Reclamation
Fund Advisory Council 16 (Jan. 9, 2013) (unpublished report) (on file with author).
19. Id. at 6.
20. See id. at 24.
21. See, e.g., W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman (Huffman I), 625 F.3d 159
(4th Cir. 2010), aff’g 588 F. Supp. 2d 678 (N.D. W. Va. 2009).
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DESIGNED TO FAIL—THE DEFICIENCIES IN WEST VIRGINIA’S
RECLAMATION BONDING AND SPECIAL RECLAMATION TAX
STRUCTURES

Coal mining wreaks havoc on the environment. A coal operator
blasts, digs, and extracts tons of waste material in order to access a seam
of coal, which may be only a few feet thick. The process exposes
material that has lain dormant within the earth for millions of years to
modern day elements. Pollutants such as iron, aluminum, arsenic,
manganese, and selenium leach out of the earth in elevated
concentrations that never would have been released under natural
conditions. Rainwater and groundwater serve as vehicles to move these
CWA-recognized pollutants from the mine site to water bodies. What
nature has tucked away and isolated from the world over millions of
years, man permanently exposes to the elements in seconds.
Congress itself recognized the environmental dangers inherent in
coal mining. In an attempt to balance the environmental needs of the
country with the economic ones, Congress enacted SMCRA in 1978.22
States have no authority to regulate surface mining unless the federal
Office of Surface Mining (OSM) Reclamation and Enforcement finds
that the state has established and maintains an appropriate state
program—one that is at least as stringent as federal law. The federal
government delegated authority to West Virginia in 1981.23 As a primacy
state, West Virginia has the authority to enforce its own SMCRA
program, which is the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining Reclamation
Act (SCMRA).24 The West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection administers this program through its Division of Mining and
Reclamation (WVDMR), along with the water program for mining
permits. West Virginia must implement its state program laws and
regulations so that West Virginia’s program is no less stringent than the
federal SMCRA.
Much of SMCRA’s requirements deal with reclamation, out of
concern for abandoned or unreclaimed mine sites. West Virginia’s
program requires that mining operators reclaim mined lands and restore
the sites to a condition capable of supporting the uses that it could
support before mining or to “higher and better uses.”25 The mine
22. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2006).
23. Conditional Approval of the Permanent Program Submission from the State of West
Virginia Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 46 Fed. Reg. 5915
(Jan. 21, 1981).
24. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-1 to -33 (LexisNexis 2009).
25. Id. § 22-3-10(a)(3)(A)(i); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(2).
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operators must create reclamation plans to meet these use requirements.26
Through the structure of SMCRA, WVDMR must approve all
reclamation plans prior to issuing a SCMRA permit. Through the CWA,
a separate federal law with state counterparts, mine operators and land
owners must meet water quality standards (WQS) in discharges of water
from mine sites.27 Reclamation plans must ensure that the mine sites do
not create water pollution problems.28 SMCRA does not relieve a mine
operator of its CWA responsibilities.
In order to ensure that a mine operator does not leave the state with
unreclaimed lands, SMCRA requires that mine operators post a
performance bond in an amount “sufficient to assure the completion of
the reclamation plan” if West Virginia has to complete the reclamation.29
West Virginia’s program is an alternative bonding system. This structure
is composed of bonding and a taxation system based on the number of
tons of coal extracted from the state. West Virginia’s program allows a
site-specific performance bond that “shall reflect the relative potential
cost of reclamation associated with” the mining activities.30 The
legislature established in 1991 that site-specific reclamation bonds could
not exceed $5000 per acre.31 There is no inflationary adjustment for
bonding. Moreover, the legislature has not adjusted the bond ceiling of
$5000 per acre since 1991, even after MTR became the primary mining
method of choice and the higher costs associated with water pollution
from mine sites became apparent to the industry and the state.
If a mining company mines the site, adequately reclaims the land,
and sufficiently meets water quality standards on any discharges
emanating from the site, then WVDMR releases the bond and the inquiry
ends there.32 However, if a mining company goes bankrupt or is
otherwise unable or unwilling to remediate the site sufficiently, the mine
company forfeits its bond.33 As discussed later in this Article, WVDMR
must then remediate the site and treat any of the discharges to meet
WQS.34 If the forfeited bond money was not sufficient to pay for the
26. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10.
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006).
28. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-10.
29. 30 U.S.C. § 1259; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11.
30. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-12.
31. Id. This Code section superseded the prior Code section (W. Va. Code § 22A-3-11),
which was the bonding section promulgated in 1991. The bonding ranges have remained the
same from 1991 through the present.
32. Id. § 22-3-23.
33. Id. § 22-3-17(b).
34. See Huffman I, 625 F.3d 159, 163 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’g 588 F. Supp. 2d 678 (N.D. W.
Va. 2009).

2013]

WATER POLLUTION FROM COAL MINING

7

expenses incurred by WVDMR to remediate, then money must be
withdrawn from one of two funds established to remediate unreclaimed
sites: the West Virginia Special Reclamation Fund (SRF) or the Water
Fund.35
The SRF and the Water Fund are funded through taxes on the
industry for the extraction of coal within the state. When the program
first began, only one fund existed. Coal operators initially paid $0.03 per
ton of coal extracted into the SRF.36 Under the SRF, $0.03 per ton was
supposedly adequate to cover all abandoned mine sites for land and water
treatment after bond forfeiture. By statute, WVDMR could spend no
more than 25% of the SRF amount for water treatment annually.37 This
severely limited WVDMR’s ability to treat water from abandoned mine
sites.
Over time, the cost of treating the existing water problems grew.
Each year, WVDMR was required to submit an actuarial report to the
legislature so that the legislature could assess the financial viability of the
SRF and increase tax rates accordingly.38 Apparently sensing that the tax
rates would have to dramatically increase from $0.03 per ton to treat the
water liabilities from acid mine drainage (AMD), WVDMR instructed
the actuarial firm that the state had no legal duty to treat water at
abandoned sites.39 Consequently, the actuarial report addressed the
viability of the SRF as though WVDMR had no duty to treat the water.
Because the actuarial report deemed the SRF fiscally sound (and due to
political pressure), the legislature did not increase the reclamation tax.
This went on for several decades.
In reality, the SRF was woefully underfunded from the beginning.
In the mid-1980s, the federal General Accounting Office concluded that
West Virginia’s reclamation bonds only paid 46% of the actual costs of
reclamation after bond forfeiture.40 By 1989, actual remediation costs
exceeded $2000 per acre, but permit bonds covered only $1000 per
acre.41 West Virginia and the OSM estimated a $6.2 million liability to
35. See West Virginia ex rel. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl.
Prot., 447 S.E.2d 920, 925 (W. Va. 1994).
36. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22A-3-11 (1990) (superseded by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11).
37. West Virginia ex rel. Laurel Mountain/Fellowsville Area Clean Watershed Ass’n v.
Callaghan, 418 S.E.2d 580, 584 (W. Va. 1992).
38. See W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, 447 S.E.2d at 922 n.9.
39. Id.
40. Craig B. Giffin, West Virginia’s Seemingly Eternal Struggle for a Fiscally and
Environmentally Adequate Coal Mining Reclamation Bonding Program, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 105,
134 (2004).
41. Id.
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remediate existing abandoned sites.42 In 1991, OSM threatened to take
over West Virginia’s SMCRA program because of the bonding
deficiencies.43
In 1992, environmental groups successfully won an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, where the court determined
that the state had a nondiscretionary duty to treat water discharges from
abandoned mine sites.44 In ruling against the state for its failure to treat
AMD at a forfeited site, the court stressed to the state the importance of
proper reclamation bonding by stating, “We note that this case illustrates
the need for the bonds to be set at levels that are sufficient to cover the
costs associated with accomplishing completion of reclamation.”45
West Virginia did not heed the West Virginia Supreme Court’s
warning. In 1994, West Virginia’s liabilities grew to $22.2 million and
that amount did not include water treatment.46 Environmental groups
again sued WVDMR, alleging the SRF and the reclamation tax were
inadequate.47 In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia found that the state had a “mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to
utilize moneys from the SRF, up to 25% of the annual amount” to treat
discharges to applicable WQS.48 WVDMR had to treat the water at the
mine sites with the money it had available.
In 1995, OSM determined that West Virginia’s abandoned mine
liabilities were approximately $62 million.49 OSM disapproved parts of
West Virginia’s SMCRA program regarding abandoned mine bonding
and funding.50 That same year, WVDMR recommended that the
legislature remove the $5000-per-acre cap.51 Forfeited bonds routinely
failed to cover the cost to reclaim the land. To this day, the West Virginia
legislature has never adjusted the cap. In 1998, WVDMR issued a report
to the West Virginia legislature that the long-term liabilities for
abandoned mines “would grow geometrically to a maximum of $53

42. Id.
43. Id. at 135.
44. West Virginia ex rel. Laurel Mountain/Fellowsville Area Clean Watershed Ass’n v.
Callaghan, 418 S.E.2d 580, 585 (W. Va. 1992).
45. Id. at 585 n.10.
46. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 137 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (S.D. W. Va.
2001).
47. See id. at 691.
48. West Virginia ex rel. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl. Prot.,
447 S.E.2d 920, 925 (W. Va. 1994).
49. Giffin, supra note 40, at 139.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 140.
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million after five years” and admitted that such growth was “fiscally
irresponsible.”52
By 2000, OSM determined that WVDMR paid an average of nearly
$3000 per acre to reclaim mine sites, but from 1992-2000 the average
bond was only $700.53 In 2001, the legislature increased that tax from
$0.03 per ton to $0.07 per ton.54 In addition, the legislature created a
“temporary tax” of $0.07 to go into the SRF.55 The legislature also
created an eight-member Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council56
that would ensure the “effective, efficient and financially stable operation
of the [SRF].”57 The Council must provide the legislature with an annual
report, in conjunction with an actuarial report, and make recommendations on the stability of the SRF and the amount of the reclamation tax.58
During its 2005 assessment, the Council recognized that if the
temporary tax expired, the SRF would result in “nearly immediate
insolvency.”59 The legislature enacted another temporary tax, at $0.074
per ton, making the total tax $0.144 per ton of coal mined.60 The
legislature required the $0.074 be allocated between the SRF and a newly
created Water Fund.61 The Water Fund received less than $0.074 per ton
of coal mined for outstanding and future water treatment at all
abandoned mine sites in the state.62 By 2011, the legislature removed the
temporary tax, and the Water Fund only received $0.015 per ton of clean
coal extracted, even as water treatment costs escalated.63 The changes in
the tax requirements were largely due to the uncertainty of the costs of
water remediation.64 In 2012, at the recommendation of the Council, the
52. Id. at 138 (quoting W. VA. DIV. OF ENVTL. PROT., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, LABOR, &
ENVTL. RES., ACID MINE DRAINAGE BOND FORFEITURE REPORT 1 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
53. Id. at 142.
54. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 16, at 6.
55. Id.
56. The Council is composed of eight members: a representative from the Secretary of
the Department of Environmental Protection, a representative from the Treasurer’s Office, the
Director of the National Mine Land Reclamation Center at West Virginia University, a member
representing the interests of the coal industry, a member representing the interests of
environmental protection organizations, the interests of the coal miners, and the interests of the
general public. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-17 (LexisNexis 2009). From at least 2010 to the
present, the position of the representative for the interests of the general public has been vacant.
57. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 16, at 6.
58. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-17.
59. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 16, at 6.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 2.
64. See id. at 4-5.

10

TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1

legislature increased the tax dedicated to the Water Fund to $0.15 per
ton.65
III. THE STATE MUST REMEDIATE RECLAMATION SITES TO MEET THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE CWA
In utilizing the Water Fund, WVDMR prioritized the list of sites it
would treat.66 It assessed the sites with the most serious pollution
problems and treated the discharges. Under the CWA (and West
Virginia’s state program), any person who discharges pollutants,
including the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection
(WVDEP) at abandoned sites, must obtain an NPDES permit.67 The
definition of “person” includes the state and state agencies.68 The
NPDES permit must set limits so that the discharge of pollutants does
not violate WQS in waters of the state. WQS protect the uses of state
waters for a variety of purposes: aquatic life, human health, public water
supply, agriculture and wildlife uses, water supply for industrial use, and
water contact recreation.69 WQS represent the level of pollutants that can
exist in a water body while maintaining a healthy water body.
Prior to 2011, WVDMR did not treat water from abandoned sites so
that the discharges would meet WQS. WVDMR did not issue itself
NPDES permits. Instead, WVDMR treated the sites to a lesser standard,
which also required less expensive treatment. This lesser standard was
not necessarily protective of the uses of the state water bodies.
WVDMR continued to report its expenditures and potential
liabilities to the Council. WVDMR’s position was that it did not have to
employ expensive treatment operations to meet WQS.70 During this time,
the legislature did not increase water reclamation tax rates to account for
the appropriate water treatment costs. Mining continued in the state,
with coal companies paying between $0.015 and $0.074 per ton of coal
to cover the cost to the state of treating water from abandoned mines.
Once again, environmental and public interest groups were
concerned about the fiscal health of the Water Fund and WVDMR’s
65. Id. at 3; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11(i)(1)(B) (2013), available at http://www.legis.
state.wv.us/wvcode/ChapterEntire.cfm?chap=22&art=3&section=11.
66. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11.
67. Id. § 22-11-3; 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(a) (2012).
68. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-11-3; 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
69. W. VA. CODE R. § 47-2-6 (2011).
70. See generally Huffman I, 625 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’g 588 F. Supp. 2d 678
(N.D. W. Va. 2009); W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman (Huffman II), 651 F. Supp.
2d 512 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman (Huffman III), 588 F.
Supp. 2d 678 (N.D. W. Va. 2009).
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treatment of unreclaimed sites. In 2007, environmental groups filed a
pair of lawsuits regarding the Water Fund in both federal judicial districts
in West Virginia.71 These groups argued that in executing its “mandatory,
nondiscretionary duty” to treat abandoned mine sites to applicable WQS,
WVDMR failed to (1) issue NPDES permits for its discharges as the
operator of discharges of pollutants under the CWA and (2) treat water
discharges to meet WQS.72 As in the previous SRF case, the
environmental groups were concerned that the reclamation water tax was
based upon WVDMR spending less money on water treatment because
those cheaper treatments did not meet WQS. Mine companies,
particularly MTR mine operators, paid less in reclamation taxes because
the Water Fund was inadequately capitalized. Environmental groups
were also concerned that water quality in the state was impacted by
WVDMR’s failure to treat abandoned mine sites adequately.
The environmental groups argued that the CWA required WVDMR
to permit its own discharges and meet WQS because it was an operator
of a discharge of pollutants.73 WVDMR claimed that it was exempt from
the CWA because it was a state entity and that it was not the original
operator of the site, an argument that had never been accepted by any
court in a CWA case.74 This argument was also contrary to WVDEP’s
long-established practice of permitting state entities like the West
Virginia Transportation Division of Highways, the West Virginia Division
of Corrections, the West Virginia Department of Education, and other
state agencies outside of mining, who not only received NPDES permits,
but also paid penalties to WVDEP for violations.
On appeal, WVDMR argued that the state “simply cannot comply”
with WQS because of the “hefty costs.”75 WVDMR argued that it was
not simply a matter of increasing the reclamation tax.76 WVDMR
claimed that if the state had to comply with WQS like every other
discharger of pollutants, it would constitute a raid on West Virginia’s
treasury.77 West Virginia had failed to require financial assurance from
both the mine operators through appropriate bonding and the mining
industry through a feasible reclamation tax. As a result, the state could

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
3240503.
77.

Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d 678.
See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 516; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 516; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 684.
Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 522 n.6; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.
Huffman I, 625 F.3d at 169.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 9, Huffman I, 625 F.3d 159 (No. 09-1474), 2009 WL
See id. at 10-14.
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not afford to abate the problems—contrary to the entire purpose of
SMCRA.
In essence, WVDMR admitted that the same mine reclamation
plans that the state had permitted and certified as meeting WQS, bonded
for amounts that allegedly assured compliance of those WQS, and then
taxed through the Water Fund to further pay for liabilities, were actually
false. The mining companies had provided bonds that were insufficient
to pay for treatment to ensure that these sites would discharge only
legally acceptable levels of pollutants and protect West Virginia’s waters.
Through its arguments, WVDMR indirectly admitted that its permitting,
bonding, and reclamation tax systems left West Virginia at risk for vast
underfunded liabilities and certain water pollution. The bonds and the
taxes that mining companies paid were insufficient for the state to treat
water to appropriate levels of pollutants before discharging into streams
under the WQS, as required by the West Virginia state water program and
the CWA.
Just as revealing were the arguments by the Interstate Mining
Compact Commission (IMCC), whose members are coal mining states.
IMCC admitted that the bonds in all of its member states were
insufficient to pay for the treatment of water for perpetual pollution
control.78 IMCC wanted the court to find in WVDMR’s favor because
the states simply did not have the money to pay for the treatment.79
Without even acknowledging that each member state was admitting
that it failed to meet the requirements necessary to have a state SMCRA
program, IMCC justified this financing failure by stating, “[T]he bond
amount would not generally cover the costs of any post-mining
pollutional discharge because the permit would not be issued if the
mining activity is expected to cause such a discharge.”80 As discussed
later in this Article, it is unequivocally false to say that states do not issue
78. Brief of the Interstate Mining Compact Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant Randy Huffman, Seeking Reversal of the Decision Below at 11, Huffman I, 625 F.3d
159 (No. 09-1474) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief].
79. See id. Although this Article focuses on West Virginia bonding, similar problems
may exist in other Appalachian surface-mining states. Virginia only requires that the bond be at
least $10,000 per bond and “sufficient to assure the completion of the reclamation plan,” with no
further monetary instructions. VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-241 (2013). OSM threatened to take over
Kentucky’s program, and the state revised its bonding amounts to “not less than $500 nor more
than $3,000 for each acre or fraction thereof of the area of land affected, with a minimum bond
of $5,000, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the requirements.” 405 KY. ADMIN.
REGS. 1:050 (2013). Tennessee does not have primacy, so the bonding program is executed
through OSM, which requires a sufficient amount to complete reclamation and no less than
$10,000 per bond. 30 C.F.R. § 800.14 (2012). OSM has not revised its regulations even though
the problems associated with MTR and perpetual pollution have been apparent for many years.
80. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 78, at 11 n.5.
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SMCRA permits if there will be postmining pollution discharges. States
have issued a myriad of SMCRA permits where the mine sites now
discharge selenium, sulfates, conductive particulates, suspended solids,
dissolved solids, illegal levels of acidic solutions, iron, aluminum, and
manganese into the indefinite future. Those mining companies are now
implementing pollution controls upwards of $50 million at individual
sites to treat perpetual pollution. West Virginia and other Appalachian
coal-mining states will inherit the same liabilities if those mine operators
fail in their reclamation efforts or become insolvent because the sites will
continue to discharge pollutants long after the profits from these
companies are gone. The impropriety of issuing such perpetual pollution
permits will bankrupt the reclamation program in West Virginia, as well
as other Appalachian coal-mining states.
The courts in both cases found that WVDMR was an operator of
discharges of pollutants under the CWA.81 The CWA provided no
exceptions for state agencies.82 As an operator, the CWA required
WVDMR to obtain NPDES permits to meet all applicable water
standards.83 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the decision that WVDMR needed to obtain NPDES permits
and meet WQS.84 The court was not persuaded by the arguments that
West Virginia (and the rest of the coal-mining states) should be excused
from meeting WQS simply because it had failed to collect sufficient
money from the mining operations, instead choosing for decades to
subsidize the cost of pollution from this trillion-dollar industry by
looking the other way.85
IV. WEST VIRGINIA HAS LIABILITIES FOR CURRENT UNRECLAIMED
SURFACE MINE SITES
As a result of the NPDES cases, West Virginia must utilize money
from the Water Fund to treat discharges from abandoned mine sites to
81. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Huffman III, 588 F. Supp.
2d 678, 691 (N.D. W. Va. 2009).
82. Although not discussed in the case, the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act,
specifically title 22, section 11-3, of the West Virginia Code and title 22, section 11-8, likewise
does not provide an exception for the state or its agencies. The Act specifically identifies the state
as a person who must comply with the West Virginia Water Pollution Control Act. W. VA. CODE
§§ 22-11-3(15), -8(6) (LexisNexis 2009); see Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 518; Huffman III,
588 F. Supp. 2d at 689, 691.
83. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 521; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92.
84. Huffman I, 625 F.3d 159, 170 (4th Cir. 2010).
85. Id. at 169 (stating the court is “not in the business of rewriting laws whenever parties
allege it is difficult to comply with them”). Relief from burdensome permitting requirements lay
with Congress, not the court. Id. at 170.
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meet all applicable water standards. In order to comply with the
requirements of the federal SMCRA to have a state program, West
Virginia must have financial assurance “sufficient to assure the
completion of the reclamation plan.”86 The reclamation plan includes
meeting CWA requirements. West Virginia does not satisfy that
requirement. West Virginia estimates that the cost to treat all 200
existing abandoned mine sites forfeited by the end of 2012 is $33.1
million for capital costs and an additional $6 million in annual operations
and maintenance costs.87 At the end of 2012, the Water Fund had a total
of $9.4 million in assets.88
West Virginia’s treatment liability estimate is likely underestimated.
The West Virginia Legislative Auditor audited the SRF and Water Fund
for the period of July 1, 2009, through June 30, 2010.89 The audit
detailed numerous issues with the way WVDMR managed the SRF and
the bonding program. The audit randomly selected 22 forfeited mine
sites and found that the reclamation liabilities were consistently
underestimated.90 This means that the deficit between the costs of current
abandoned mine treatment and the money in the Water Fund are likely
far greater than WVDMR has estimated. The alleged existing gap in
excess of $24.4 million in capital expenditures and $6 million per year in
operation and maintenance costs may in reality be a gross underestimation.
In 2012, the legislature increased the amount of the Special
Reclamation Tax, including the amount for the Water Fund. As of July 1,
2012, mining companies pay $0.15 per ton of coal extracted into the
Water Fund.91 The caps on bonding have not increased since 1991. The
Water Fund had assets of $8.7 million in 2011; in 2012, after six months
of increased taxes, it held $9.4 million, an increase of only $700,000.92

86. 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a) (2006).
87. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 11. This estimate was not
updated since the 2011 Special Reclamation Fund Advisory Council Annual Report. It is unclear
whether WVDMR has kept track of new liabilities since its last required report to the federal
court in 2011, but it seems unlikely that in over a year, the treatment costs would remain
unchanged.
88. Id. at 6.
89. LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT DIV., W. VA. LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, LEGISLATIVE AUDIT
REPORT: WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SPECIAL RECLAMATION
FUNDS & FUND 8796 (2012).
90. Id. at 12.
91. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-3-11 (2013), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/wv
code/ChapterEntire.cfm?chap=22&art=3&section=11.
92. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 6; Special Reclamation
Advisory Council, supra note 16, at 8.
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The 2007 cases on water treatment at reclamation sites arose from
concerns with WVDMR’s treatment of mining sites with AMD
problems.93 AMD results in an increase in the pH of water and the
precipitation of harmful chemicals into streams.94 AMD is a serious
problem that states across the country have dealt with for many years.
WVDMR’s liabilities for remediation of AMD are high.95 However, a
more expensive water treatment liability exists. These cases did not
directly deal with the bigger problem lurking behind the concern for the
Water Fund: the remediation of forfeited MTR sites.
V.

RECLAMATION OF MTR SITES WILL INCREASE DEFICITS IN THE
WATER FUND

MTR methods vary significantly from underground and traditional
surface mining techniques in ways that implicate the viability of the
Water Fund. The MTR method of mining coal in Appalachia involves
blasting the soil and rock on top of a mountain to expose coal deposits in
the upper strata of the mountain. Mining companies acquire the property
rights to the mountain and use explosives and large-scale demolition
equipment to remove the top portion of the mountain to access seams of
coal. Mining companies use ammonia nitrate fertilizer and fuel oil to
blow up mountains, the same mixture used in the Oklahoma City
bombing, but mine explosions are 10 to 100 times stronger.96
MTR destroys all of the trees and vegetation in the process. Mining
removes and displaces topsoil as well. Mining companies remove as
much as 1000 feet of overburden from the mountain.97 This permanently
alters the contour of the mountain.
When the top of the mountain is removed, not all of the material is
coal. Most of the material contains rock and other minerals, which are
mining spoils or overburden. For every ton of coal extracted, MTR
creates 16 tons of overburden.98 Overburden expands when miners
remove it from the mountain. Once the overburden is removed and

93. Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512, 515 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Huffman III, 588 F. Supp.
2d 678, 683 (N.D. W. Va. 2009).
94. Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 683.
95. See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 529; Huffman III, 588 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
96. Julia Fox, Mountaintop Removal in West Virginia: An Environmental Sacrifice Zone,
12 ORG. & ENV’T 163, 166 (1999).
97. EPA, EPA/600/R-09/138F, THE EFFECTS OF MOUNTAINTOP MINES AND VALLEY FILLS
ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS OF THE CENTRAL APPALACHIAN COALFIELDS 7 (2011), available at
http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?P_download_id=501593.
98. John McQuaid, Mining the Mountains, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Jan. 2009, at 74, 79.
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smashed into smaller pieces, the overburden expands by 30% to 35%.99
Not all of the overburden will fit back into the reclaimed mountain.
After recontouring the mine, the mine companies must dispose of 20% to
25% of extra overburden.100
The mining company permanently places this excess overburden in
another area. Overburden in Appalachian MTR sites is typically placed
in valleys, which are natural areas that are lower than the mountain,
resulting in a “valley fill.”101 A valley fill looks like a dam, but with
mining waste inside instead of clean water. Mining destroys springs and
ephemeral, intermittent, and small perennial streams on the mountain’s
surface.
Rainwater, snowmelt, and natural springs flow into the valley fill
and filter through the fill material. As the water flows out of the valley
fill, it picks up a variety of CWA pollutants, including polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), iron, manganese, selenium, arsenic, and
a combination of ionic compounds that elevate conductivity levels.102
This water is collected and discharged into a stream, which constitutes a
CWA point source that requires an NPDES permit. Water quality
standards must be met at the point of discharge. Thus, pursuant to the
CWA, whatever water comes out of the fill must meet all applicable
WQS prior to entering a stream.
MTR mining leaves a bigger footprint than traditional mining
methods. Because the mine operator creates a mountain-size crater in
the earth, each MTR site disturbs upwards of 3100 acres.103 Mining
companies use draglines that cost over $100 million, are as high as a 20story building, and weigh 8 million pounds.104 MTR with valley fills has
disturbed approximately 12 million acres in West Virginia, Kentucky,
Virginia, and Tennessee.105 In a report issued in 2010, WVDEP used
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to quantify the miles of land
disturbed and loss of streams within the West Virginia mountains.106 The
analysis identified 1821 spoil fills and 270 refuse fills (usually slurry
impoundments, which contain pollution from washing impurities and
99. Syd S. Peng, Mountaintop Removal Controversy Slows West Virginia Coal Mining,
MINING ENGINEERING, Sept. 2000, at 53, 56.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Griffith et al., supra note 7, at 9.
103. Peng, supra note 99, at 53.
104. Fox, supra note 96, at 166.
105. EPA, supra note 97, at ii.
106. Michael Shank, W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Trends in Mining Fills and Associated
Stream Loss in West Virginia 1984-2009, at 1 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished paper) (on file with
author).
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pollutants from the coal prior to sale), totaling 56,780 acres or over 88
square miles in the coalfields of West Virginia.107 The analysis estimated
that the fills from MTR resulted in the loss of over 844 miles of
intermittent and perennial streams.108 The stream loss was relatively
concentrated, with half of the stream loss occurring within 23 watersheds
in the state.109 Stream loss exceeded 10% in 14 of these watersheds.110
Despite the requirements of SMCRA and the CWA, discharges
from MTR sites do not comply with WQS. The illegal discharge of
pollutants has negatively impacted aquatic life. Research has found that
“surface coal mines degrade water quality and substantially alter stream
biota well downstream of their permit boundaries.”111 MTR sites result in
elevated fine sediments from valley fills and the erosion of streambeds
caused by changes in stream flow.112 Streams below valley fills have
elevated levels of sulfate, nitrate, nitrite, bicarbonate, calcium,
manganese, potassium, sodium, and chloride ions.113 Valley fills also
release elevated levels of selenium.114
This pollution does not occur in isolation; real impacts to the quality
of West Virginia’s waters occur. Loss of aquatic life biodiversity occurs
in up to 2880 miles of West Virginia streams due to “the propagation of
surface coal mining pollutants through the regional river network.”115
Scientists have documented cranial and facial deformities in fish from
selenium pollution.116 MTR sites continuously release illegal quantities
of CWA pollutants and destroy and impair aquatic life. An “EPA study
found that nine out of every 10 streams downstream from surface
mining” in Appalachia exhibit significant impacts to aquatic life.117 The
state may ultimately have to bear the entire cost of treating these sites to
stop the pollution if it is unable to recover the funds from polluters.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id.

Emily S. Bernhardt et al., How Many Mountains Can We Mine? Assessing the
Regional Degradation of Central Appalachian Rivers by Surface Coal Mining, 46 ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH. 8115, 8120 (2012).
112. Griffith et al., supra note 7, at 8.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Bernhardt et al., supra note 111, at 8121.
116. Lindberg et al., supra note 7, at 20,932-33.
117. Memorandum from Peter S. Silva, Assistant Adm’r for Water, EPA, & Cynthia Giles,
Assistant Adm’r for Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA, to Shawn Garvin, Reg’l Adm’r,
EPA Region 3 et al. 2 (Apr. 1, 2010) (on file with author).
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VI. FUTURE RISKS TO THE MINING INDUSTRY AND THE STATE
It seems relatively clear that West Virginia’s outstanding liabilities
on currently abandoned mines exceed the money collected from those
forfeited bonds and the existing money in the Water Fund. What if more
sites are forfeited? Can the money held in current bonds adequately pay
for future water liabilities?
Substantial obstacles block a comprehensive evaluation of West
Virginia’s potential liabilities. The West Virginia Legislative audit found
that WVDMR “consistently improperly calculated” the bond amounts for
mining permits, “which would result in permits being under-bonded.”118
This underbonding occurs partly because the legislature has continuously
refused to raise the $5000-per-acre cap since 1991. In addition,
WVDMR consistently bonds sites below the $5000 ceiling. The audit
attempted to analyze 1764 bonds, but could not obtain “relevant, reliable
reports” from the WVDMR and could not determine whether the bonds
were properly calculated.119
The audit also criticized WVDMR’s practice of allowing selfbonding from mining companies. The audit noted that it was not able to
obtain reliable information from the WVDMR’s system. It found that
one self-bonded mining company was bonded for over $174 million.120
However, the documentation showed that the mining company was
approved for financial assurance of only $125 million.121 This would
leave West Virginia with $49 million in liability that the company may
not be able to pay.
WVDMR’s response on self-bonding was especially enlightening
and frightening. WVDMR corrected the auditor’s initial report by
identifying Massey Energy and Alpha Natural Resources (the company
that purchased Massey) as the self-insured entity. WVDMR stated that
after the merger, Alpha Natural Resources had over $186 million in total
outstanding amounts of self-bonds.122 WVDMR further stated that Alpha
Natural Resources is approved for $375 million in self-bonds, as if that
should provide confidence in the self-bonding process.123 The fact that
WVDMR evaluates $375 million in self-bonded risk for one company
(one that is now suffering significant quarterly losses) speaks volumes

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT DIV., supra note 89, at 56.

Id. at 6 n.1.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id.
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about WVDMR’s bonding practices and its attitude about surface mining
in general.
The audit criticized the policy of self-bonding as riskier than other
securities.124 WVDMR’s response was that both surety and bank bonds
have become insolvent in the past.125 The conclusion by WVDMR—that
self-bonding, surety bonding, and bank bonding are all susceptible to
substantial risk of insolvency—should not ease the minds of the citizens
of West Virginia who have to live with and pay for the pollution of
surface mining that should have full financial protection under SMCRA.
VII. POTENTIAL FAILURE IN THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY AND MTR
METHODS IN PARTICULAR
Is the coal industry at risk of a large-scale failure? Environmental
groups have exerted intense pressure on the coal industry through
lawsuits and the enforcement of the CWA. Surface mining companies
face a particularly expensive problem with selenium violations.
Selenium is a toxic pollutant that bioaccumulates in fish and
humans.126 The EPA surveyed 78 MTR sites with valley fill streams and
found that 73 had selenium water concentrations greater than the
threshold for toxic bioaccumulation.127 Research has confirmed that West
Virginia streams in mined watersheds have selenium concentrations that
exceed toxic levels for aquatic life.128 Toxic levels of selenium cause
embryotic deformities in fish and reproductive failure in fish and birds.129
As a result, states have issued fish consumption advisories due to
selenium.130 Selenium is a serious water quality issue in MTR areas,
especially West Virginia. Research has documented severe physical
deformities in two species of fish in the Mud River reservoir,131 which is
downstream of MTR sites (including Patriot Coal’s behemoth Hobet 21).
WVDMR was not ignorant of the problems of selenium. It just
chose to look the other way. West Virginia’s WQS establish quantitative
in-stream criteria to protect human health (acute criteria) and aquatic life
(acute and chronic criteria).132 However, WVDMR did not impose or
124.
125.
126.
(2010).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
M.A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop Mining Consequences, 327 SCIENCE 148, 148

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lindberg et al., supra note 7, at 20,932-33.
See W. VA. CODE R. § 47-2 app. E, tbl.1 (2013).
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enforce selenium limitations on coal mining operations until environmental groups filed lawsuits over selenium violations of WQS. In 2003,
EPA recognized selenium as a pollutant of concern in MTR operations.133
When WVDMR reluctantly included these criteria in permits, WVDMR
also granted unlimited, indefinite stays to the mining companies, making
those limitations unenforceable and giving companies no effective
limits.134 Environmental groups, through lawsuits in federal court,
eventually stopped that unlawful practice.135
The state was aware for many years that coal companies were
discharging illegal quantities of selenium due to MTR and that the
mining companies were unwilling to treat, remove, or reduce the
selenium from its discharges, despite the mandates of state water law and
the CWA. In 2009, the legislature itself recognized the issues with
selenium but questioned whether it was an issue in the state.136 During
this entire time, WVDMR continued to issue MTR NPDES permits,
knowing that mining companies would discharge illegal quantities of
selenium and that sites were not installing selenium treatment
technology.
Based on inadequate enforcement by WVDMR, environmental
groups challenged the mining companies’ illegal pollution actions.
These lawsuits were successful. In 2010, a federal court ordered Patriot
to invest in selenium treatment at two of its mine sites (Ruffner and
Hobet 22) in West Virginia after Patriot failed to convince the court that it
was moving at a reasonable speed towards compliance.137 The court
ordered Patriot to install fluidized bed reactor treatment (FBR) at the
Ruffner mine site to achieve compliance with selenium limits by March
1, 2013.138
The court required Patriot to post a $45 million Irrevocable Letter
of Credit with the court for financial assurance.139 In contrast, Patriot is
bonded with the state of West Virginia for the Ruffner mine for a total of
$6,600,640.140 The $6.6 million bond with West Virginia supposedly
133. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Coal-Mac, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 900, 905 (S.D.
W. Va. 2011).
134. See id. at 905, 925.
135. See, e.g., id. at 929.
136. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-11-6 (LexisNexis 2009).
137. See Order Specifying Relief, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Apogee Coal Co., 744
F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (No. 07-00413).
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id. at 2.
140. This figure was derived by adding up all outstanding surety bonds (bond numbers
1015322, 1058001, 8205-64-51, 400SA1616, 1062292, 1062293, 1062294) associated with all
pending SMCRA permits (permit numbers O502394, S007585, S507986) for the Ruffner mine
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represents an adequate amount of money for WVDMR to remediate the
land and treat the water from the site. Even after a federal court
determined that selenium treatment alone at the site will exceed $45
million, WVDMR is protected from liability only to $6.6 million. In the
event that Patriot abandons the site, West Virginia’s liability would be
over $30 million for the construction of selenium treatment alone. In its
required monthly status report to the court on June 10, 2013, Patriot
disclosed that it has paid over $37 million to date on the project and
estimates it will cost nearly $10 million more to complete the project.141
However, Patriot has run into some significant problems with its project.
As of September 3, 2013, Patriot has notified the court that it has
problems with the FBR, including a total of seven failures related to
“excessive wear and pump failures.”142 Additionally, the moving bed
biofilm reactor has clogging problems, there is “excessive wear” on the
effluent pumps, and there is “failure of every motor” at the Mudlick
pumps.143 It appears as though Patriot has significant problems with its
selenium removal equipment, and fixing those problems sounds
expensive. No report to date has been issued on those costs.
The court’s foresight to require a bond of $45 million will ensure
that Patriot (or its successors) will complete up to $45 million in
construction.144 However, West Virginia remains unprotected for the cost
of annual operations if Patriot does not successfully emerge from
bankruptcy.145 Patriot has not disclosed in public filings to the court the
annual costs for operation and maintenance for its selenium treatment.
(NPDES permit number WV0099520). The bond data was acquired from the WVDEP through a
Freedom of Information Act request by the author, received October 15, 2012, and on file with
the author. The permit numbers were retrieved from the Department’s Web site. Coal/Quarry
NPDES Application Search, W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., http://www.dep.wv.gov/insidedep/
Pages/coalquarryndpespermitsearch.aspx (enter “WV0099520” into “Permit Number” field; then
click “Go” button) (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
141. Thirty-Second Monthly Status Report at 3, app. A, Apogee Coal, 744 F. Supp. 2d 561
(No. 07-00413).
142. Id.; Quarterly Status Report at 1, Apogee Coal, 744 F. Supp. 2d 561 (No. 07-00413).
143. Thirty-Second Monthly Status Report, supra note 141, at 3; Quarterly Status Report,
supra note 142, at 1-2.
144. Order Specifying Relief, supra note 137, at 1. In a companion case, the court
subsequently reduced the letter of credit amount to the amount remaining to complete
construction on the selenium treatment technologies. The court has not required a letter of credit
to ensure that even if Patriot becomes completely insolvent, adequate money remains to actually
operate the selenium treatment. See Order at 2, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc. v. Hobet Mining,
LLC, 723 F. Supp. 2d 886 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (No. 09-01167).
145. The author filed a motion to intervene on behalf of an environmental group in a
settlement involving the same selenium outlets. The group asked to intervene to request that the
court establish a letter of credit or funds to protect the state for operating costs. Because of the
ongoing bankruptcy, the group was unable to ask for relief and withdrew the motion to intervene.
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However, CH2M Hill, the company that is installing the treatment,
estimated in 2010 that an FBR would cost $3 million annually for
operation and maintenance.146 Patriot’s recent serious problems with
numerous aspects of its selenium removal equipment further illustrates
the problems WVDMR faces on selenium.147 Installing selenium
treatment facilities is an exercise in futility if the operator or the state
cannot afford to properly operate and maintain the systems.
Patriot’s selenium treatment obligations are not limited to Hobet 21
and Ruffner. In 2012, Patriot Coal settled an environmental group
lawsuit involving selenium violations, where it agreed to pay the EPA
$750,000 and an additional $6.75 million to the West Virginia Land Trust
administered by West Virginia University.148 It also agreed to treat
selenium to WQS at four of its sites.149
In filings with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Patriot informed its investors that treatment for selenium
liabilities would cost an estimated $440 million over 30 years.150 Months
after the selenium settlement, Patriot filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
quickly asked the bankruptcy court for permission to ask the Southern
District Court of West Virginia for relief from $29 million in
environmental treatment that it must have implemented to meet
limitations requirements.151 On January 9, 2013, the court approved a
settlement152 negotiated between the environmental groups and Patriot
whereby Patriot would stop MTR mining as a way to make “a reduction
[in its] environmental footprint.”153 At this point, it is uncertain what will
happen with that bankruptcy, but it is clear that if Patriot is unable to
restructure its business into a profitable venture without using MTR
methods, West Virginia will inherit a large portion of that estimated $440

146. TOM SANDY & CINDY DISANTE, CH2M HILL, REVIEW OF AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGIES
FOR THE REMOVAL OF SELENIUM FROM WATER, at xv (2010), http://www.namc.org/docs/00062756.
PDF.
147. See Quarterly Status Report, supra note 142.
148. Dan Lowrey, Patriot Reaches Potentially Costly Agreement To Treat Selenium from
Coal Mines, SNL COAL REPORT, Jan. 23, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
149. Id.
150. Ken Ward Jr., Patriot Selenium Deal Falls Through, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Sept. 13,
2012), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201209130136.
151. Dan Lowrey, Court Allows Patriot To Seek Delay in Implementing Selenium Cleanup
Plans, SNL COAL REPORT, Oct. 15, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
152. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 8, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Patriot Coal
Corp., No. 11-00115 (S.D. W. Va. dismissed Jan. 9, 2013).
153. Ken Ward Jr., Patriot Coal To Phase Out MTR Mining, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov.
16, 2012, at 1A.
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million in selenium pollution clean-up. Patriot owns 11 active mines,
with 9 of those mines located in West Virginia.154
West Virginia has not received adequate financial assurance from
Patriot for these liabilities. Twenty of the twenty-six Patriot entities that
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy have provided WVDMR with surety
bonds.155 Those bonds total over $158 million, covering over 49,000
acres of disturbed area (an average of $3200 bonded per acre).156 If
Patriot’s reorganization is unsuccessful and those sites become
abandoned, WVDMR’s secured sureties will not cover even half of the
estimated $440 million in selenium liabilities alone estimated by Patriot
to its stockholders, even though 75% of Patriot’s active mine sites are
located in West Virginia. The bonds must cover remediation for all water
pollution and land remediation as well.
Patriot is far from the only coal company with massive selenium
treatment liabilities. In 2010, WVDMR identified 180 outfalls in the
state as violating selenium limits.157 Alpha Natural Resources settled a
lawsuit brought by environmental groups for selenium violations at 3
mine sites for a $4.5 million penalty158 to the West Virginia Land Trust.
The estimated construction cost to treat selenium was estimated at $50
million.159 Environmental groups sued Alpha for selenium violations at
an additional nine mining sites in West Virginia in July 2012.160
Arch Coal settled a selenium lawsuit with environmental groups at
6 mine sites with a $2 million penalty.161 In 2012, Arch also settled a $4
million lawsuit with the EPA, West Virginia, and Kentucky involving
other pollutants and an outfall with selenium violations.162 Arch agreed
to install a passive selenium treatment system as part of the settlement.163
Arch has not made cost estimates for this treatment available to the
public.
154. Operations, PATRIOT COAL, http://www.patriotcoal.com/index.php?view=operation
s&p=3 (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
155. W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Surety Bond Database (Oct. 15, 2012) (unpublished
spreadsheet) (on file with author) (obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request to
WVDEP).
156. Id.
157. Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15, at 2.
158. Steve Hooks, Enviros Sue Alpha Natural Resources Anew over Selenium Discharges,
PLATTS COAL OUTLOOK, July 23, 2012, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Lowrey, supra note 4.
162. Arch Coal Clean Water Act Settlement, supra note 5. The author discloses that she
was involved in the finalization of this settlement with the court through the representation of
West Virginia, but was not involved in the negotiations or the actual settlement.
163. Id.
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The problems and costs associated with existing MTR should
concern the state because of the ecological impacts and the risk to the
Water Fund. If coal companies abandon MTR sites with selenium
violations, the state must pay to install and maintain treatment systems to
reduce pollution. In 2010, Paul Ziemkiewicz, member of the Special
Reclamation Advisory Council as the Director of the National Mine
Land Reclamation Center and researcher at the West Virginia Water
Research Institute (housed at West Virginia University), finalized a
research report to the Special Reclamation Advisory Council.164 His
report assessed the potential risk that West Virginia faces if it has to treat
selenium at all of the sites identified by WVDMR as being in violation
of selenium limits in West Virginia. Ziemkiewicz provided the report to
the Advisory Council prior to the finalization of its 2011 Annual Report,
but the selenium report is not mentioned in the Annual Report.
Ziemkiewicz based his selenium report on 180 outfalls in West
Virginia that WVDMR identified that did not meet the less than 4.7 µg/L
selenium limit.165 The report chose two treatment options based on the
court’s ruling and selection of treatment in the Patriot case.166 The report
estimated treatment costs based upon the flow data from the 180 outfalls
identified by WVDMR.167 The amount of flow from the outfalls
determines the types of technology that are appropriate for viable
selenium reduction.
Calculations of actual costs took into account direct capital cost for
installation, indirect capital costs for project management, and operation
and maintenance for 20 years of operating costs.168 The liability costs for
selenium treatment alone for the 180 outfalls that did not meet selenium
WQS range from $1.925 trillion ($133 billion for 125 sites discharging
under 200 gpm plus $1.792 trillion for 44 sites discharging over 200
gpm), under a lower confidence limit estimate, to $7.983 trillion ($534
billion for 125 sites discharging under 200 gpm plus $7.449 trillion for
55 sites discharging over 200 gpm), under an upper confidence limit,
with a mean of $3.964 trillion estimated for treatment for 20 years.169
This estimates the costs for a combination of zero-valent iron and fixedbed reactor treatments (based on the gallons per minute needed to
treat).170 Alternatives for other treatment technologies included zero164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
See Huffman II, 651 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D. W. Va. 2009).
Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15.
Id. at 2, 4.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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valent ion treatment by the company CH2M Hill—with costs from $814
million to $3.298 billion and a mean of $1.652 billion for 125 sites
discharging under 200 gpm.171 Reverse osmosis for 55 sites discharging
over 200 gpm would cost from $2.859 trillion to $10.490 trillion, with a
mean cost of $4.976 trillion for 20 years of treatment.172
The report did not take into account the potential that discharge
limitations could become stricter (requiring more treatment) for outfalls
that discharge into water bodies that are now impaired under CWA
section 303(d) for excessive selenium. Due to the many years of flagrant
violations by coal companies, 77 water bodies in West Virginia are now
impaired by selenium.173 Section 303(d) impairment means that these
waterbodies will not support the proper water uses (for selenium, those
streams cannot adequately support aquatic life or human health uses) due
to their excessive levels of selenium. Due to existing pollution, mostly
from mining impacts, the streams exceed WQS.
Because the streams exceed WQS, the CWA requires West Virginia
to implement a watershed Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) to
reduce permit limitations from every source of selenium contributing
into the watershed, including any unreclaimed mine sites, in order to
lower the selenium levels of the stream. This could also cause more sites
to be in noncompliance, adding to the 180-outfall estimate. It could also
increase treatment costs to allow for treatment to remove more selenium
from water prior to discharge to meet lower limits.
The selenium research based the estimates on treatment for 20
years, whereas the state itself has now estimated it will need at least 35
years to treat pollution from existing abandoned mine sites for other
pollutants. Ziemkiewicz recently finalized research based on one mine
site in West Virginia.174 Based on that one large mine complex with 67
outlets using monthly reporting of selenium levels and a watershed study
in the Mud River, his research estimated that selenium would naturally
attenuate to existing regulatory water quality levels in 23 years.175 The
research found that “estimated field selenium concentrations increased to
a maximum value of 25.8 μg/L within seven years” and “the mine outlet
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., WEST VIRGINIA 2012 DRAFT SECTION 303(D) LIST
(2012), available at http://www.dep.wv.gov/WWE/watershed/IR/Documents/2012_Draft_303(d)_
Documents/2012_303(d)_Complete_Document_M112012.pdf.
174. P.F. Ziemkiewicz & R.J. Lovett, Natural Selenium Attenuation at the Lab, Outlet, and
Watershed Scales, W. VA. MINE DRAINAGE TASK FORCE (2012), http://www.wvmdtaskforce.
com/proceedings/12/6-Ziemkiewicz-Se-Concnetrations-TF-2012.pdf.
175. Id.
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study indicated that the average selenium value reached a maximum of
26.3 μg/L.”176 The existing water quality limit is 5 μg/L.177 Of course,
that is without a TMDL in place in the Mud River. A TMDL would
lower the regulatory limit for discharges to reduce the selenium load in
the river—most likely significantly.
A further limitation of the selenium cost report is that it is based
only upon a snapshot of selenium violations at one point in time.
Assuming WVDMR’s data is accurate,178 the report relied only on
selenium violations as of 2010. It does not take into account the fact that
MTR sites are continuously discharging pollutants and that those sites
could violate selenium limitations in the future. The number of outfalls
violating selenium limits will only increase. MTR persists in West
Virginia to this day. Companies are now required to institute more
extensive overburden handling plans so that selenium is not exposed in
the process. Whether it will work remains to be seen, especially because
those assurances come from the same mine companies that created the
selenium problem and the state that refused to recognize selenium as an
issue in the first place.
Ziemkiewicz’s report also failed to take into account past sites
where WVDMR certified the reclamation plans and released the bonds.
Citizen groups now allege that previously-released sites violate WQS.
One lawsuit alleged that the current owners of the first MTR site in West
Virginia, Bullpush Mountain,179 discharge selenium and conductive
particles in levels that exceed WQS. Mining was completed and the
bond was released in 2008. Although the Bullpush Mountain lawsuit
was voluntarily dismissed, other lawsuits have been filed against large
landowning companies like Pocahontas Land Corporation, a subsidiary
of Norfolk Southern Corporation.180

176. Id.
177. W. VA. CODE R. § 47-2 app. E, tbl.1 (2013).
178. Considering that WVDMR failed to include selenium limitations in many of the
MTR NPDES permits reasonably likely to exceed safe limits and that WVDMR has been largely
remiss in enforcing selenium limitations due to the sweetheart stays offered to mining companies,
WVDMR’s 180 outfalls are probably underestimated. Even assuming that as a result of federal
lawsuits brought by environmental groups, some of these outfalls will have treatment
technologies installed, the author’s research has found only one mine site where treatment
technology has been fully constructed and has successfully met selenium limits. That site is the
result of the Arch Coal settlement with the EPA and West Virginia. See Arch Coal Clean Water
Act Settlement, supra note 5.
179. Ken Ward Jr., New Lawsuits Target Mountaintop Removal Landowners, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (May 29, 2013), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201305290045.
180. Id.
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VIII. THE STATE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPROPERLY RELEASED SITES
THAT DO NOT MEET WQS
Let us assume that there are a number of sites where, because of
politics and improper reclamation practices, the bonds were released but
the sites discharge pollutants above WQS. What will be done with those
sites?
The Water Fund is not responsible for sites once reclamation is
approved and the bond is released because the state has terminated its
jurisdiction under SMCRA.181 WVDMR would likely argue that it does
not have any obligation or authority to expend funds to reclaim those
sites because it has lost jurisdiction. However, because selenium and
other pollutant discharge problems do not generally just spontaneously
arise but are the result of improper overburden waste handling and poor
reclamation practices, it is almost certain that those mine sites discharged
illegal levels of pollutants in violation of the West Virginia Water
Pollution Control Act and CWA when WVDMR approved the
reclamation and released the bond.
Using a theory such as Ziemkiewicz’s research on natural pollutant
attenuation, an environmental group could argue very persuasively that
the mining company misrepresented its pollutant levels when it requested
closure. Under SMCRA, the state must reassert jurisdiction over the site
if the release “was based upon fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation of a
material fact.”182 Even if WVDMR refuses to make such a determination,
an environmental group could file a lawsuit in federal or state court
seeking a writ of mandamus to force WVDMR to perform its mandatory
duty, or it could appeal the decision to OSM.
A court determines misrepresentation under SMCRA using an
objective standard, which means the state or an environmental group
would have to show that a reasonable person would find that the mining
company intentionally misrepresented that its discharge met WQS.183
OSM represented to the court in National Wildlife Federation v. Lujan
that “[i]f an operator applies for release but has not fulfilled his
obligations, he is guilty of misrepresentation by the very fact of making
an application.”184 Thus, it seems likely that some of these released sites
were the product of misrepresentation because the site did not meet WQS
181. See 30 C.F.R. § 700.11 (2012); see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Lujan, 950 F.2d. 765,
766 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding termination of jurisdiction under SMCRA upon release of the
performance bond a reasonable interpretation of the Act).
182. 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(d)(2).
183. See Lujan, 950 F.2d. at 770.
184. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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prior to the application for release. The state may have to reassert
jurisdiction. The site could then become abandoned under SMCRA if
the original operator refuses to reclaim to WQS or is insolvent. Without
a performance bond in place, WVDMR would have to treat the water
using the Water Fund or enforce against the current landowner, which is
often a large out-of-state landholding corporation. To date, WVDMR
has not enforced against landowners of surface mines. In 2012,
WVDMR received only $61,960 in civil penalties from forfeiture sites.185
In addition to the CWA violations that a citizen can seek against the
mine operator or the current landowner, an environmental group may
also use 30 C.F.R. § 700.11(d)(2) to force WVDMR to reassert SMCRA
jurisdiction if a coal company likely knew that the site discharged
selenium at levels in excess of WQS at the time it applied for release.
The site could then fall under treatment by the Water Fund.
It is unclear at this time how many sites exist where WVDMR
closed and released the bond, but the site continues to discharge illegal
pollutants. It is highly unlikely that any of those released sites met WQS
at the time of closure, given WVDMR’s track record on water pollution
from surface mining. WVDMR did not even properly evaluate selenium
at current sites until forced to by federal court, so it would be improbable
that it properly evaluated the pollution discharged from postreclamation
sites. West Virginia’s outstanding selenium liabilities could easily exceed
$10 trillion over the next 20 years or longer.
IX. POTENTIAL FUTURE REQUIREMENTS
In addition to selenium liabilities, WVDMR has estimated that
water liabilities only account for treatment to meet current WQS. WQS
may become more stringent in the future (more protective of water uses),
which would require more expensive treatment at abandoned sites. This
is particularly true for watersheds that fall under the 303(d) listing due to
excessive pollution. Stricter WQS could also make previously treated
sites fall into noncompliance. This added treatment would increase the
costs to the Water Fund. The Special Reclamation Advisory Council and
WVDMR have not taken those risks into account in assessing the Water
Fund’s viability.
One such example is specific conductivity. Conductivity is the
measure of salinity in water.186 Conductivity is associated with mixtures
185. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 8, fig.3.
186. EPA, EPA/600/R-10/023F, A FIELD-BASED AQUATIC LIFE BENCHMARK FOR
CONDUCTIVITY IN CENTRAL APPALACHIAN STREAMS 1 (2011), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/
ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=233809.
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of calcium, manganese, sulfate, and bicarbonate salt ions.187 The EPA has
established through scientific research that elevated levels of
conductivity are associated with aquatic life impairment. The EPA
reported, “Fish, amphibians, mussels, and aquatic macroinvertebrates are
especially exposed on their gills or other respiratory surfaces that are in
direct contact with dissolved ions in water.”188 The EPA has also linked
elevated levels of conductivity to MTR with valley fill operations in
Appalachia and in West Virginia specifically.189
In 2010, the EPA issued guidance on conductivity in West Virginia,
limiting MTR discharges to 300-500 µS/cm.190 That guidance document
was challenged in federal court by coal mining associations and the state
of West Virginia.191 In July 2012, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia invalidated that guidance, concluding that the EPA
had exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the guidance; the
science itself was never evaluated by the court.192 The issue is currently
on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
However, concurrent to the EPA ruling, the West Virginia
Environmental Quality Board (EQB) issued a decision on an NPDES
permit for Patriot Mining Company that requires WVDMR to implement
limits on conductivity regardless of the status of the EPA’s guidance.193
The EQB is a statutorily created administrative board that reviews
appeals of NPDES permitting and enforcement decisions by WVDEP.194
The EQB operates independently from WVDEP.195 Each EQB member
must have knowledge and experience in the state’s water resources.196
The EQB that issued the conductivity decision consisted of five members
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2.
189. See id. at viii, xv.
190. Press Release, EPA, EPA Issues Comprehensive Guidance To Protect Appalachian
Communities from Harmful Environment Impacts of Mountaintop Mining (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e77fdd4f5afd88a3852576b3005a604f/4145c96189a17
239852576f8005867bd!OpenDocument.
191. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 880 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2012).
192. Id. at 142.
193. See Sierra Club, Appeal No. 10-34-EQB, at 25-26 (W. Va. Envtl. Quality Bd. July 30,
2012) (final order), available at http://www.wveqb.org/finalorders/10-34-eqb%20-%20supple
mental%20final%20order.pdf.
194. See W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22B-1-1 to -12 (LexisNexis 2010).
195. Board members are appointed by the governor to serve five-year terms, with the
advice and consent of the state Senate. No more than three members of the same political party
may serve on the EQB at the same time. Board members may not receive “a significant portion
of the member of the board’s income directly or indirectly from a national pollutant discharge
elimination system permit holder or an applicant.” Id. § 22B-3-1.
196. Id.
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experienced in water quality regulations with four of the members
holding doctor of philosophy degrees in science and all five working in
the field of environmental science.197
The EQB’s decision was based upon four days of expert testimony
that included scientists who published academic research in peerreviewed articles on the actual damage to West Virginia streams from
elevated levels of conductivity. The experts testified that surface mining
itself released high concentrations of conductivity through fragmenting
and exposing rock to surface water.198 Expert witnesses for the Sierra
Club testified that elevated levels of conductivity correspond to mining
watersheds impaired for aquatic life.199 High levels of surface mining in
watersheds correspond to high levels of conductivity.200
The Board received testimony that high levels of conductivity
reduce macroinvertebrate diversity, which is a building block of stream
biodiversity.201 Without biodiversity in streams, “ecosystem function
collapses” and stream function is impacted.202 Experts testified that MTR
mining causes biological impairment in streams for macroinvertebrates
through the chain to fish, amphibians, and birds.203
Based on this testimony, the EQB found that elevated levels of
conductivity violate the state narrative WQS. The narrative WQS criteria
prohibits discharges of “‘[m]aterials in concentrations which are
harmful . . . to . . . aquatic life’ or that cause ‘significant adverse impacts
to the . . . biological components of aquatic ecosystems.’”204 As a result,
when a reasonable potential analysis indicates that a mine’s discharge
will violate the narrative WQS, WVDMR must impose conductivity
limits.205 Although the EQB did not set a numeric limitation on
conductivity, it found that the narrative criteria guides the limitation.
Thus, all mining sites, including sites on the abandoned mine list under
the Water Fund, must not discharge materials in amounts that produce
conductivity levels that result in harm to aquatic life or significant
adverse impacts to aquatic ecosystems.

197. Board Members, W. VA. ENVTL. QUALITY BD., http://www.wveqb.org/board.asp (last
visited Nov. 2, 2013).
198. Sierra Club, Appeal No. 10-34-EQB, at 9.
199. Id. at 11-12.
200. Id. at 9.
201. Id. at 13, 17.
202. Id. at 10-11.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 22 (citation omitted) (quoting W. VA. CODE R. §§ 47-2-3.2.e, -3.2.i (2012)).
205. See id. at 23.
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This decision was appealed by both WVDMR and Patriot Mining
Company. EQB decisions are appealed to the Circuit Court of Kanawha
County, West Virginia, a state trial court of general jurisdiction, presided
by judges who are elected through partisan county elections. The circuit
court reversed the EQB’s decision on February 13, 2013.206 The court’s
sole basis for reversal was the D.C. Circuit’s decision that the EPA’s
guidance was administratively invalid and that the EQB gave no
deference to WVDMR’s interpretation of the narrative guidance. The
court ignored all of the expert testimony received by EQB over the fourday period and the fact that WVDMR and Patriot failed to adduce any
expert witnesses to oppose the evidence providing an association
between conductivity levels, mining, and water quality impairment. The
court also ignored the findings of the EQB of actual impairment in
mining watersheds and the correlation to conductivity.
Instead, the court deferred to the WVDMR’s “interpretation of
water quality standards” and did not address the fact that WVDMR had
actually failed to interpret the narrative standard.207 WVDMR actually
did not publish a guidance document until after the NPDES permit was
approved. This “guidance” consists of an eight-page document taking a
“wait and see” approach: wait until a problem exists in the watershed
and then threaten the mine companies with limits (similar to the unlawful
approach taken by WVDMR in selenium).208 There is no scientific
analysis in the eight-page guidance. The court also failed to identify how
the EQB’s finding that WVDMR failed to recognize documented and
consistent evidence of actual biological impairments in streams where
high levels of conductivity from surface mining occur was contrary to the
evidence in the record.209 Instead, the court wrongly relied upon
inapplicable case law and ignored West Virginia Code section 22B-1-7
(stating EQB appeals shall be heard de novo) by requiring the EQB to
206. Patriot Mining Co. v. Sierra Club, Nos. 11-AA-102, 11-AA-104, at 8 (Cir. Ct. of
Kanawha Cnty., W. Va., Feb. 13, 2013), available at http://www.jacksonkelly.com/pdf/2-1313%20Final%20order%20(2).pdf. The author notes that she was counsel for WVDEP from
February 2010 through May 2011, while the initial appeal was pending before the circuit court.
However, she was not an employee when the appeal was briefed and was not involved in the case
at all. She was only an employee during the waiting period between the appeal and a decision by
the circuit court. She was not an employee of WVDEP when the case was argued before the EQB
or when the final decision by the EQB was entered.
207. Id. at 5.
208. See Permitting Guidance for Surface Coal Mining Operations To Protect West
Virginia’s Narrative Water Quality Standards, 47 C.S.R. 2 §§ 3.2.e and 3.2.i, W. VA. DEP’T OF
ENVTL. PROT. (May 11, 2012), http://www.dep.wv.gov/pio/Documents/Narrative/2010-08-18.%
20Narrative%20Standards%20Permitting%20Guidance%20(Rev.%201).pdf.
209. See Sierra Club, Appeal No. 10-34-EQB, at 9, 12-13.
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defer to WVDEP’s eight-page guidance. The court wrongly focused on
the role of the EPA on state permitting, even though the EPA did not
impose conductivity requirements in this case, the EPA had approved the
permit without conductivity limits, and the EPA was not a party to the
case before the EQB or the court.210
The court never found any grounds to exclude or ignore expert
testimony on conductivity and its effects. The court needed to find that
WVDMR’s expertise contradicted the expert testimony in order to defer
to WVDMR, but the court wholly failed to address this issue. The court
also found that the EQB tried to establish de facto effluent limitations
when the EQB expressly did not impose any numeric limits.211 In its
actual order, the EQB merely directed WVDMR to use the available
scientific evidence on conductivity to establish a limit necessary to
protect the narrative standard, which WVDMR is statutorily required to
do.212 In light of the extensive expert testimony adduced during the four
days and the fact that the court used the wrong standard of review by
solely attacking the EPA’s guidance and requiring deference to WVDEP,
this case was appealed and is pending before the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia.
At this time, it is not known what levels of conductivity would
violate the West Virginia narrative standard. However, the EPA’s
guidance provides strong scientific evidence linking conductivity to
impairment of aquatic life. The science behind the EPA’s conductivity
guidance was not invalidated and should be used by mining regions in
the absence of scientific evidence-based research by the states.
Conductivity treatment may increase the liabilities for the Water Fund
significantly.
Counsel for mining companies that operate West Virginia surface
mines, including Patriot Mining Company in the EQB conductivity case,
have argued that the mining industry cannot achieve conductivity levels
without using “reverse osmosis—a technology not affordable to the
surface mining industry.”213 Other counsel for mining companies have
argued that reverse osmosis and evaporation/crystallization will reduce
conductivity, but are “very expensive to build and operate,” requiring
See Patriot Mining Co., Nos. 11-AA-102, 11-AA-104, at 6-7.
Id. at 4-5.
Sierra Club, Appeal No. 10-34-EQB, at 23-24.
Robert G. McLusky, Sierra Club Seeks To Impose Conductivity and Sulfate Limits
on Discharges from Kentucky Mines, ENERGY & ENV’T MONITOR BLOG (Jan. 18, 2012), http://
210.
211.
212.
213.

eem.jacksonkelly.com/2012/01/sierra-club-seeks-to-impose-conductivity-and-sulfate-limits-ondischarges-from-kentucky-mines.html. McLusky is counsel for Patriot Coal in the conductivity
and selenium cases.
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large areas of space for installation.214 If complying with conductivity
limits is not financially feasible for the for-profit surface mining industry,
it cannot be financially feasible for the state and its $9.4 million Water
Fund.
WVDMR and the Special Reclamation Advisory Council have not
researched the potential risks for conductivity treatment at abandoned
sites. However, in his research on selenium, Ziemkiewicz included the
cost for reverse osmosis technology as an option for the removal of
selenium.215 According to counsel for coal companies in West Virginia,
the same reverse osmosis technology would be used for conductivity
treatment. Cost estimates by Ziemkiewicz for reverse osmosis to meet
selenium WQS could vary from the cost estimates to treat to conductivity
WQS. However, Ziemkiewicz’s estimates are a reasonable beginning
estimate of the risk of liability West Virginia faces for conductivity
treatment at abandoned mine sites.
Ziemkiewicz estimated that for 55 outlets, treatment using reverse
osmosis would cost at least $2.859 trillion for 20 years of treatment, with
a maximum estimate of $10.490 trillion for 20 years of treatment.216 The
mean cost of treating 55 outlets would be $4.976 trillion.217 These
estimates do not take into account the cost of site access, site preparation,
construction of flow equalization ponds, water diversions, or the cost of
bringing electrical power into the remote surface mine sites, which are
also significant costs.218
Conductivity pollution is more widespread than selenium.
Violations of selenium WQS are limited to selenium-bearing coal seams.
The EPA has designated the entire coalfield area in the state of West
Virginia as subject to the conductivity benchmark of 300-500 µS/cm.219
Moreover, the EQB’s ruling applies to all NPDES permitting within the
state. Because WVDMR did not require conductivity limits or even
214. Robert Stonestreet, Stream Conductivity: It’s Not Just a Mining Issue, POWER MAG.
(Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.coalpowermag.com/commentary/Stream-Conductivity-Its-Not-Just-aMining-Issue_306.html. Mr. Stonestreet also advises that seawater conductivity levels are at
levels that would harm freshwater aquatic life. Needless to say, West Virginia has not promulgated seawater aquatic life water quality standards. This author has oceanfront property in West
Virginia to sell Mr. Stonestreet if he truly believes this comment to his clients. Mr. Stonestreet
also astutely points out that Gatorade exceeds the conductivity levels for EPA’s aquatic life
protections as well. Although not a product liability practitioner, this author would advise Mr.
Stonestreet to contact the manufacturer of Gatorade if dead fish are present in his Gatorade and
consult other help if he expected live ones.
215. Ziemkiewicz, supra note 15, at 1.
216. Id. at 7.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 6.
219. See Arch Coal Clean Water Act Settlement, supra note 5.
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sampling of surface mining outlets until recently under its NPDES
program, the number of outlets in violation of WQS for the narrative
criteria is unknown at this time. Given that the problems identified by
the EPA’s analysis appear to be more widespread than the problems
identified with selenium, it is reasonable to assume that significantly
more than 55 outlets are in noncompliance with West Virginia WQS for
conductivity. Thus, West Virginia’s risk of liability for reverse osmosis to
treat conductivity could easily exceed $10.490 trillion over 20 years of
treatment.
X.

LEGAL COSTS

In addition to the basic treatment, operating, and administrative
costs associated with the state operating as an NPDES permittee, other
significant costs may increase the liability to the Water Fund. Now that
West Virginia is a permittee, it also has the risk of enforcement that is
inherent to all NPDES permittees who violate the terms of their NPDES
permits. The Special Reclamation Advisory Council has failed to take
into account the cost for the state to defend itself against citizen suits for
the state’s failure to meet WQS at abandoned surface mine sites.
When the state does not meet WQS in a reasonable amount of time,
the risk of a suit by citizens will increase. When a lawsuit is filed against
West Virginia for violations of the CWA, the state will then feel the
pressure that citizen groups like West Virginia Highlands Conservancy,
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, and the Sierra Club have exerted
on the coal industry in the past decade.
The amount of money that coal companies (and their insurers) have
paid law firms is not public information, and any ballpark figure would
be unreliable conjecture. However, West Virginia has been involved in a
number of high-profile cases where it has defended itself and the coal
industry from challenges by citizen groups and the EPA. The private law
firm of Bailey & Glasser LLP represents WVDMR in coal mining
related litigation, rather than state attorneys in the Office of Legal
Services at WVDEP or the West Virginia Attorney General.220 Bailey &
Glasser’s representation of WVDMR is exempt from the bidding process
that normally accompanies contractor work with the state.
Bailey & Glasser has represented WVDMR intermittently since
Bragg v. Robertson in 1999221 and continues to represent WVDMR, most
220. Benjamin L. Bailey, BAILEY & GLASSER, http://www.baileyglasser.com/people/
Benjamin-Bailey.htmx (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
221. 190 F.R.D. 194 (S.D. W. Va. 1999).
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recently in the challenge to the EPA conductivity guidance (which
continues in litigation on federal appeal) and with issues arising from
Patriot Coal’s recent bankruptcy.222 Bailey & Glasser also jointly
represented WVDMR in the losses in federal court requiring NPDES
permitting of abandoned surface mine sites.
From a review of warrants paid through the West Virginia State
Auditor’s Office, WVDEP has paid Bailey & Glasser over $2.3 million
for work over a period of 6 years (1999 to 2003 and 2010 to present).223
If Bailey & Glasser continues its representation in issues related to
bonding, reclamation, and surface mining, then those attorney’s fees will
likely increase.
It is unclear from what fund WVDMR would pay for its own
representation in enforcement actions against itself—the Water Fund or a
WVDMR Fund. Because the Office of Legal Services plays the role of
enforcer for all state CWA enforcement litigation, it is possible that
WVDMR would use outside counsel like Bailey & Glasser to defend
itself in the role of violator. The argument should be made that
enforcement penalties and attorney’s fees constitute part of the cost for
remediation and should be paid from the Water Fund. The surface coal
mining industry should pay for those costs through the Special
Reclamation Bond Program and the Water Fund tax, not taxpayers
through WVDMR’s state budget.
XI. FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE WATER FUND
West Virginia’s SRF and Water Fund are essentially pyramid
schemes. Liabilities are funded based upon the ludicrous presumption
that mining will increase through time and continue far into the future at
sustainable levels. Taxes that are paid on extracted coal today pay for
liabilities from forfeitures 20 years ago. Likewise, whatever taxes are
paid in the future will pay for the existing liabilities created by mine sites
permitted today and those forfeited in the future. When the coal industry
declines, so will the taxes paid into the Water Fund. West Virginia may
currently be at the zenith of the amount of money going into the Water
Fund. Like Wimpy in Popeye, the coal companies have gladly promised
to pay West Virginia tomorrow for their pollution today.
In 2012, the Consensus Coal Production and Price Forecast for West
Virginia (2012 Consensus) estimated that coal extraction in the state will
222. Benjamin L. Bailey, supra note 220.
223. Vendor Payment Search, W. VA. STATE AUDITOR’S OFFICE, http://www.wvsao.gov/
VISTAlite/VendorSearchlite.aspx (enter “Bailey & Glasser” into search box; then click “search”)
(last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
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decrease from 134.6 million tons mined in 2011 to 96 million tons by
2020.224 This reduction represents a loss of 38.6 million tons, so West
Virginia would receive $5.79 million less in 2020 for the Water Fund
(using the current tax rates). The 2012 Consensus estimate is significant
because it reflects a severe drop in estimated coal mined in West Virginia
from estimates even a year earlier. In 2012, the prospects for the coal
economy in West Virginia reflected a more dramatic drop in production
in a shorter period of time—a decade shorter than the 2011 estimates
(which also predicted significant decreases in the coal market). The
2012 coal market dropped 6.5% in the first quarter of 2012 compared to
the first quarter of 2011.225
The decline in the tax money going into the Water Fund is
significant in light of current actuarial reports. The 2012 actuarial report
found that the Water Fund would be depleted by 2037, using current tax
rates and assuming that no expenditures from the Water Fund would
occur until 2019.226 However, the Water Fund had assets of $8.7 million
in 2011; in 2012, even after six months of increased taxes, the Water
Fund held $9.4 million, an increase of only $700,000, despite over 100
million tons of coal mined in West Virginia.227 This amount indicates that
money is currently being expended from the Water Fund, despite the
calculations in the actuarial report.228 In the 2011 actuarial report,
WVDMR stated that it would continue to pay for water liabilities from
the general SRF and not use the Water Fund until June 2018 in order to
allow the Water Fund to build assets.229 So it is unclear how the Water
Fund would remain solvent until 2037 if solvency was based upon no
spending until 2019. With current expenditures and little gains in the
Water Fund, it seems likely that the Water Fund will become insolvent
much sooner than predicted.
The money in the Water Fund does not even come close to paying
for existing liabilities, and it is certain that it cannot pay for future
liabilities either. Fewer tons mined means that the Water Fund will
decrease continuously through 2020, using current tax rates, while new

224. GEORGE W. HAMMOND, W. VA. UNIV., CONSENSUS COAL PRODUCTION AND PRICE
FORECAST FOR WEST VIRGINIA: 2012 UPDATE 1 (2012).
225. Id.
226. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 6.
227. Compare id. ($9.4 million in assets), with Special Reclamation Advisory Council,
supra note 16, at 8 ($8.7 million).
228. Special Reclamation Advisory Council, supra note 18, at 6.
229. PINNACLE ACTUARIAL RES., INC., ACTUARIAL VALUATION OF THE SPECIAL
RECLAMATION FUND & SPECIAL RECLAMATION WATER TRUST FUND 2 (2011).
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reclamation sites will increase steadily, even in ideal economic
conditions.
XII. CONCLUSION
West Virginia created a scheme whereby it continuously approved
mining permits that resulted in perpetual water pollution that impairs
aquatic life. Then it systematically underbonded these same polluting
sites, ignoring the known risks and the costs to reclaim those risks. Next,
it undertaxed the entire mining industry for the Water Fund that was
supposed to be the fail-safe program to back up its woefully underfunded
bond system. As the final insult to the citizens of West Virginia, when
faced with raising the tax rates on the coal industry, WVDMR instead
denied that it had to meet WQS because, unlike every other discharger in
the entire United States, it argued that it maintained some sort of special
status because it had no money due to purposely underfunding itself
rather than making the mining industry pay for its pollution from its
booming coal-mining business.
It is disheartening to know that a state whose legacy recognizes that
coal companies abused and took advantage of the state’s miners for
decades through harsh labor conditions not only allowed but also
encouraged and facilitated coal companies to abuse and take advantage
of its taxpayers under the guise of economic development, energy, and
jobs. West Virginia miners unionized and fought against company scrip,
payable only in the mining company’s store, only for the state to accept
the equivalent of scrip—worthless or underfunded bonds and taxation
systems—to ensure the health of its citizens and environment.
Political theory accurately explains what has occurred in West
Virginia. West Virginia became an “environmental sacrifice zone,” by
providing cheap power to the country and increasing the profits of coal
barons at the expense of its own environment and communities.230 The
environmental impacts facilitated by the improper mining permitting and
bonding processes from the 1970s to present fits Robert Nixon’s
description of “slow violence,” a delayed destruction spread over space
and time, not typically perceived as violence at all, but resulting in
environmental degradation inflicted upon the poor.231 The social
constructs and political processes aligned in what John Gaventa
described as power and powerlessness in the history of the Appalachian
230. Fox, supra note 96, at 163; see also Jedediah S. Purdy, Rape of the Appalachians, AM.
PROSPECT, Nov./Dec. 1998, at 28.
231. See generally ROB NIXON, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR
(2011).
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Valley since coal was first discovered.232 The power of absentee
landowners with coal interests shifted the balance from the need for
consent from the governed to the absentee landowners governing the
consent of men.233 The state and the EPA’s refusal to meaningfully
enforce against flagrant violations by coal mines is environmental
injustice against the people of West Virginia.234 Mining technologies may
have improved to allow more coal extraction, but results haven’t changed
since the mining industry entered West Virginia over a century ago. The
citizens of West Virginia pay for the wealth of absentee coal owners.
Even worse than financial ruin, citizens warned the state that MTR
was seriously affecting their health for years. Now, emerging academic
research indicates through peer-reviewed scientific evidence that
residents in areas near MTR sites suffer from illnesses with more
prevalence than nonmining Appalachian areas.235
This Article addresses the reality that West Virginia faces very
serious fiscal and environmental problems from surface mining. These
problems must be addressed within the next decade. The problems in
bonding amounts must be resolved prior to the insolvency of mine
232. See generally JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND
REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY (1980).
233. Id.
234. See generally Sarah J. Surber, Environmental Enforcement as a Shield Rather than a

Sword: How Environmental Injustice Resulted from Increased Coal Mining Violations After a
Settlement with the Environmental Protection Agency, 6 ENVTL. JUSTICE 169 (2013).
235. See, e.g., Melissa M. Ahern et al., The Association Between Mountaintop Mining and
Birth Defects Among Live Births in Central Appalachia, 1996–2003, 111 ENVTL. RESEARCH 838,
843 (2011); Laura Esch & Michael Hendryx, Chronic Cardiovascular Disease Mortality in
Mountaintop Mining Areas of Central Appalachian States, 27 J. RURAL HEALTH 350, 354 (2011);
Michael Hendryx & Keith J. Zullig, Higher Coronary Heart Disease and Heart Attack Morbidity
in Appalachian Coal Mining Regions, 49 PREVENTATIVE MED. 355, 358 (2007); Michael Hendryx
et al., Hospitalization Patterns Associated with Appalachian Coal Mining, 70 J. TOXICOLOGY &
ENVTL. HEALTH 2064, 2068 (2007); Michael Hendryx et al., Lung Cancer Mortality Is Elevated
in Coal-Mining Areas of Appalachia, 62 LUNG CANCER 1, 5 (2008); Michael Hendryx, Mortality
from Heart, Respiratory, and Kidney Disease in Coal Mining Areas of Appalachia, 82 INT’L
ARCHIVES OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. HEALTH 243, 247 (2007); Michael Hendryx, Poverty and
Mortality Disparities in Central Appalachia: Mountaintop Mining and Environmental Justice, 4 J.
HEALTH DISPARITIES RES. & PRAC. 44, 48 (2011); Michael Hendryx & Melissa M. Ahern,
Relations Between Health Indicators and Residential Proximity to Coal Mining in West Virginia,
98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 669, 670 (2008); Michael Hendryx et al., Self-Reported Cancer Rates in
Two Rural Areas of West Virginia with and Without Mountaintop Coal Mining, 37 J. COMMUNITY
HEALTH 320, 324 (2011); David C. Holzman, Mountaintop Removal Mining: Digging into
Community Health Concerns, 119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A476, A483 (2011); Travis L.
Knuckles et al., Air Pollution Particulate Matter Collected from an Appalachian Mountaintop
Mining Site Induces Microvascular Dysfunction, 20 MICROCIRCULATION 158, 165 (2012); see
also Keith J. Zullig & Michael Hendryx, A Comparative Analysis of Health-Related Quality of
Life for Residents of U.S. Counties with and Without Coal Mining, 125 PUB. HEALTH REP. 548,
553 (2010).
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operators. The recent increase of the Special Reclamation Tax does not
address the liabilities from future bond forfeitures combined with a
decreasing mined tonnage and the resulting reduction in taxable coal.
WVDMR chronically failed to (1) adequately tax and require
reclamation bonds from mining companies that sufficiently covered the
risk of environmental damage caused by mining and (2) apply WQS to
mining sites. The West Virginia legislature blatantly refused to increase
the amount of the coal reclamation tax or the reclamation bond ceilings.
As a result, West Virginia allowed coal companies to inundate its water
bodies with illegal quantities of pollutants without adequate financial
assurance to remediate the sites to clean up the polluted streams in the
event coal companies abandoned those sites. West Virginia also failed to
adequately consider that MTR sites would need permanent water
treatment for perpetual discharges of pollutants and that the coal
companies were not sufficiently bonded or financially solvent to pay for
the risk of perpetual water treatment.
What could West Virginia do to improve the status of the Water
Fund? It looks as though it could be entirely too late to fix the problems
that decades of mismanagement and corporate greed have created. The
pollution created from MTR cannot be undone. West Virginia must
strike immediately in order to secure as much money as it can from the
coal industry before the industry skips out on West Virginia.
West Virginia must reassess all existing reclamation bonds. Clearly,
the bonds have no basis in reality to estimate the risk of liabilities.
Reclamation bonds based upon acres mined makes absolutely no sense
with regards to water liabilities. Just as Ziemkiewicz estimated in his
report, West Virginia should base bonding on the gallons-per-minute flow
of water that will be discharged from the site. The legislature should
require WVDMR to take the amount of the highest potential cost of
treatment technology and fully bond that amount. That is the only way to
comply with the requirements of financial assurance under SMCRA and
ensure that future abandoned sites requiring treatment do not end up as
liabilities for the Water Fund.
West Virginia must “gather ye rosebuds while ye may.”236 The state
needs to fund the Water Fund and the bonding program as much as
possible now while the coal industry remains solvent. The recent
legislative Special Reclamation Tax increase does very little to improve
the status of the Water Fund. The Special Reclamation Tax does not take
into account the reality that the state’s entire budget will significantly
236. THE COMPLETE POETRY OF ROBERT HERRICK 117 (J. Max Patrick ed., 1963).
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decrease as coal mining decreases. The state will need to reduce its
budget across the board and cannot afford to redirect other money into
the Water Fund.
West Virginia needs to get out of the business of managing the
Water Fund and assessing surety bonds by privatizing the venture. Let
the coal industry find and pay for a capable financial institution to insure
the long-term effects of MTR. A financial institution should bear the
burden of financial risk of wholesale implosion of the coal industry.
Even aside from the SRF and Water Fund, West Virginia’s track record on
managing trust funds and insurance is deplorable. The state of West
Virginia mismanaged the Worker’s Compensation system (now
privatized), the Underground Storage Tank Fund (now defunct), the
teachers’ pension fund (underfunded), and the state employees’ pension
fund (underfunded). The fact that the legislature has maintained this
Special Reclamation rouse in the face of repeated failures of the state in
other financial endeavors is incredible.
These problems with the Water Fund must be addressed before the
industry is significantly impacted by a decrease in mining. Even more
disconcerting is that the state continues to permit new mines, even
though it knows that the significant risks for water treatment exist and
are not ameliorated in new surface mine operations, particularly MTR
with valley fill sites. WVDMR has overwhelming, certain, and
uncontroverted evidence that perpetual postmining pollution discharges
result from MTR and continues to permit MTR under SMCRA.
WVDMR must stop permitting surface mining sites that result in
perpetual water pollutant discharges. WVDMR permits today the future
abandoned, polluting mine sites of tomorrow.
West Virginia has not met its obligations under federal SMCRA for
financial assurance. As a result, the state now faces discharges from
hundreds of sites that do not meet WQS without the financial resources
to treat these sites. Under SMCRA, West Virginia’s authority under
SMCRA can be revoked for these failures, and OSM can enforce
existing permits and issue new permits in its place. This Article
establishes a plethora of reasons why OSM should revoke West Virginia’s
SMCRA authority due to a chronic failure to properly bond and seek
financial assurance “to protect society and the environment from the
adverse effects of surface coal mining operations,” as set forth in
SMCRA.237
Other reasons for revocation, such as inadequate
enforcement of CWA and SMCRA violations at MTR sites, failure to
237. 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006).
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properly evaluate cumulative hydrologic impact assessments (CHIAs),
and failure to properly certify that MTR sites would meet state WQS
under section 401 of the CWA may exist, but are not addressed by this
Article and should be the subject of further research.
This Article also raises the question of what have we learned from
MTR permitting and bonding in West Virginia? Political decisions are
not made using rational decision making, particularly when a powerful
lobby like coal mining directs the conversation. Political influences can
outweigh the need for serious investigation into potential problems and
eliminate any thought of foresight. The EPA, OSM, the Army Corps of
Engineers, and WVDMR did little to nothing for more than a decade
while water quality declined and liabilities piled up. All of the checks
and balances in the SMCRA system failed the citizens of West Virginia.
Only the federal courts, with judges secure in lifetime appointments and
largely free from political pressures, prompted by citizens concerned for
the environment and the health of themselves and their neighbors, have
moved to force the coal industry to comply with the explicit requirements
of SMCRA and the CWA.
Citizens must continue to exert pressure on industry and the state
through the federal judiciary. Any time that any industry emerges to use
the state’s natural resources and impact its environment, West Virginians
and the rest of the country cannot rely upon the state’s assurances that the
practice is safe or that the costs will be paid. A person does not have to
believe in environmentalism, in climate change, in adverse health effects
from MTR and the burning of coal, or the importance of a healthy
benthic community to see that MTR is a financial plague on West
Virginia. MTR in West Virginia is the most expensive form of corporate
welfare in the United States.
This Article establishes the potentially trillion-dollar debt the coal
industry will certainly impose on West Virginia. The only question is
how many more years, with newly filled streams and additional blownup mountains, West Virginia has before this debt comes due. The coal
industry wrote an expensive check that the state can never cash, at the
expense of West Virginia’s environment and its people. As a result, West
Virginia, through its complete acquiescence to the desires of the coal
industry, has burdened future generations of West Virginians with debts
and pollution it cannot possibly afford. In essence, West Virginia’s
politicians have privatized profits to the benefit of Fortune 500
companies like Massey Energy Company, Alpha Natural Resources, and
Patriot Coal Corporation, while socializing the costs to burden one of the
poorest and generally worst-off states in the country.

